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PRISONERS OF WAR
AS INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY
Walton K. Richardson
. Historical Development of the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Prisoners of
war historically hav(! heml used as
instruments of foreign poli~y. From
ancient times to the Vietnam war there
has been a growing concern for the
humane treatment of prisoners of war.
This trend is evident from an examination of the attempts to codify tIll!
standards of treatment accorded to prisoners into rceogni:r.ed rules of international law. This changc of standards
falls logically into four stages. The
divil;ion between these stages is not
sharp and precise. Rather, overlapping
appnars as the neW method of treatment
repluc(!s the old in gradual transition.
N(werthdess, a ddinit(! progression is
nolit'(!ahh! in whieh eat:h mod(! of hun·
tiling prisOIlI'rs LI('(:allH!, in turn, tIll!
generally ~I(:cept(:d praetil!(:,
It is during the last slag(:, tIll! 20lh

century, that the most definitive rules
for humane treatment of prisoners of
war have been developed into international law in the aftermath of World
War II. It seems a paradox, though, that
concurrently the actual treatment of
these victims of war has degenerated to
the treatments common during the
earlier slages.
In ancient times, from llll! first
armed conflicts recordctl in tIll: history
of mankind, the almost universal fate of
the captive was death. 1 He was either
slaughtered on the hattlcfidd, tortured
and put to death after the hallIe, or
used as a sacrificial offering. The eircllmstanees varied, but his fate. was
utmost inevitlluh:. TI!slimony of this
pmdie(! is giVl'n in IIIwimlt hislorielll
writings, illduding llw Old 'I'eslanll!lIt,
as well as in scenes depicted on hasrdids. 2
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The transition to the second stage
also took place in ancient times. It
probably was largely motivated by economic considerations. Ancient' conquerors came to the realization that
profit was to be gained by sparing the
lives of captives and making them their
slaves. Gradually it became the acceptcd
custom to make slaves of those captured
in battle. Entire' nations were subjected
to slavery. In fact, captivity resulting
from battle was the origin of the practice of slavery. 3 The Romans generally
enslaved their prisoners, although they
also killed some outright and developed
others as gladiators.
Humanitarian concern for captives
appeared for the first time in the third
stage. Yet, the basic economic factor
remained very much in evidence. Prisoners not held in slavery were returned
to their homes after payment of ransom. The practice of ransom had been
used previously on occasion, notably in
ancient tribal warfare and by the Greeks
ani! Romans. However, during these
times the practice was more an isolated
act of mercy rather than the prevailing
custom. It was not until the Middle
Ages that ransom supplanted slavery as
the normal practice in the fate of
prisoners of war, especially those of
aristocratic origin.4 A significant codification of the practice of ransom resulted when the Lateran Council of
1179 prohibited enslaving captives who
were Christian. s
The final stage was attained with the
emergence of the nation-state system
and modern international law. Humanitarian considerations became increasingly influential as the treatment of
prisoners of war was addressed and
defined in international agreements.
Most historians trace the start of this
stage to the Treaty of Westphalia of
1648, which ended the Thirty Years
War. This was the first international
instrument to establish modern rules for
the treatment of prisoners of war. It
provided that prisoners of both sides

were to be freed without payment of
ransom and without exception or rescrvations. 6
Shortly before this Hugo Grotius, the
eminent Dutch jurist commonly referred to as the Father of International
Law, published in 1625 his great work,
De J uro Belli ac Pacis. Grotius exerted
profound influence on the development
of international law with his appeal to
the law of nature as a moderating
influence in the conduct of war. Although he continucd to rccognh.. e the
right to cnslave captives, he advocated
exchange and ransom instead. 7
The fourth stage was characterized
by bilateral treaties and unilatcral declarations. Between 1581 and 1864 there
were at least 291 international documents dealing with the treatment of the
sick, wounded, and captured. One of
the more important was the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce between the
United States and Prussia in 1785. The
First Geneva Convention (1864) was
patterned closely after it. 8
The first tentative step in the transition to the great multilateral treaties of
the 20th century was the diplomatic
conference called by Switzerland at
Geneva in 1864. The 12 participating
nations produced thc Geneva Convention of 22 August IBM for the Amdioration of the Conditions of Soldiers
Wounded in Armed Forces in th~
Ficld. 9 Its 10 articles were the first
attempt to create international law by
virtue of the ratification or accession of
all the great powers. This First Geneva
Convention was .ratified by all the
powers by 1867. It was ratified by the
United States in 1882 and subsequently
by a total of 54 nations. 1 0
From this time until around the turn
of the century and the start of the
Hague Conventions of 1899, several
attempts were made to codify the rules
of warfare, including treatmcnt of prisoners. The most notable of thcse oeeUITI!d in Septemb(!r ] 880, wlll!lI the
Institute of International Law adopted a
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"Manual of the Laws and Customs of
War" at Oxford, England. Although
never adopted, the "Oxford Manual," as
it became known, influenced the treatment of prisoners of the Boer War. 11
The First Hague Conference, called
in May 1899, produced three conventions. Convention No. II dealt with the
laws and customs of land warfare and
contained a section of 17 articles conccrning the treatment of prisoners of
war.12 These articles were based largely
on the Oxford MiIliual and were ratified
as part of Convention No. II by 24
nations, including the United States.
The Geneva Convention of 1906 for
the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Sick and Wounded in Armies in the
Field, drafted by representatives of 35
nations, contained 33 articles which
were more comprehensive and explicit
than those of the First (1864) Geneva
Convention.
The Second Hague Conference, hcld
in 1907, produced 14 conventions
covering the conduct of war, which
included an updating and improving of
the articles pcrtaining to prisoners of
war contained in the Hague Convention
No. II of 1899.
A distinction should be made hetwem} the laws and rules or" the Geneva
Conventions of ] 1164 and 1906 (as wdl
as the subsequent 1929 and 1949 conventions) and laws and rules resulting
from the· conventions of the Hague
Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Both
conventions arc based on, and motivated by, humanitarian 'considerations.
There is some redundancy between the
two, particularly with regard to prisoners of war. Basically, the Hague Conventions codify the rules of war and
attempt to restrict the usc of weapons
and the application of force in war. The
Gmu!va Conventions, on the other hand,
arc SIII!cifically cont:t!nwd with tltt: prott!ction of the individual against the
abust: of force in wartime. J 3
The Two World Wars. The experiencc

of WorId War I demonstrated the need
for increased protection for prisoners of
war and the necessity of improving the
provisions of the Geneva. and Hague
Conventions. Starting in 1921 the Intcrnational Law Association and the International Rcd Cross (IRC) recommended
review and amplification of the Hague
Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva
Convention of 1906. These efforts led
the Swiss Government to issue invitations to 47 nations to aLtend a confercnce in G(!neva, starting in July 1929, to
revise the conventions on prisoners of
war. On 27 July the delegates adopted
two conventions; the Geneva Convention of 1929 for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and the
Sick of Armies in the Field and the
Geneva Convention of 1929 Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. In
approving these conventions the delegates were for the first time attempting
to create international law directed
toward the humanitarian treatment of
prisoners of war rather than merely
recording existing practices as had heen
done· at the two Hague Conferences
(1899 and 1907).14
By the time of American entry into
World War II in December 1941, 35
nations had ratified or announced their
adlwrt:nc(: to tht: Geneva Convt:ntionl! of
1.929. Six additional nations announced
their adherence during the war. The
U.S.S.R. aeccded in 1932 to the convention concerning humane treatment of
the siCK and wounded. However, she
refused to accept as hinding the convention relative to prisoner-of-war treatment on the contention that the Hague
Convention No. IV of 1907 was adequate. Japan never did announce adherence to the Geneva Convention of
1929. 15
Tlu: crud and inhumane treatment of
Allit:ti prisont:rs of war lit tht: hands of
tIlt! Japanese has bt:en well chronided.
The saga of the Balaan Death March
remains infamous. Tht: apparent basis
for this treatment can be traced, in part,
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to a differing Oriental philosophy and a
general antipathy for Caucasians. The
Japanese interrogated prisoners of war
primarily to obtain military information; they wcre required to perform
tiring menial work under adverse conditions and wcre severely punished for
violation of rulcs. The difference in
diets between the Japanese captors and
the Western prisoners of war also contributcd to the plight of the eaptives. 16
The Nazi regime of Hitler earned iLs
mark in history for inhumanity. The
gmlocidc of HII estimated 6 million Jews
and the ruthless reigns of terror imposed
in occupied areas of Europe during
World War II led to the Nuremburg
Trials. Despite this barbarous record,
the treatment of American and British
prisoners of war by their German captors, though not exemplary, did reflect
conscious attempts to adhere to the
Geneva Convention of 1929. 17
The record of treatment of prisoners
of war in the hands of the U.S.S.R.
during and after World War II is atrocious. In 1939, when the Nazi-Soviet
pact was still in effect, it was known
that the bulk of the Polish Officcr Corps
had surrendered and were in Russian
hands. In April 1943 the Germans announced to the world the discovery of
mass graves in till: Katyn forest !!Ontaining the remains of some 8,000 Polish
officers. The Soviets denied the allegation, labeling the German announcement a propaganda ploy. However, the
Soviets, not the Germans, refused to
permit an investigation by the IRC.
Subsequently, it was confirmed that this
mass murder was perpetrated by the
Russians in 1940. 18
Further indications of Soviet callousness toward human life in general and
prisoners of war in particular arc given
in the Churchill memoirs. During the
"Big Three" summit meeting at Tehran
in December 1943, Stalin announeed
that it would probably be necessary to
liquidate some 50,000 officers of the
"German Commanding Staff" as a

means- of insuring a permanent solution
to thc problem of postwar G(~rman
rcsurgence. Churchill was so appalled by
the proposal that he abruptly left the
meeting.
The tolal number of German prisoners of war and civilians displaccd to
Russia to "help rebuild Russia" will
probably never be known. 19 Indications
of the cynical and ruthless disregard of
all humaniLarian principlcs hy the
U.S.S.R. wcre (widmleed at Llw Mm;('()w
Con fermlee of Forl!ign l\1inil:lh~rs, when
Molotov .lIInoune(:d on I'" M.m:h 19"'7
that 1,003,974 German prisoners of war
had been released and that 890,532
were still being held. Not only was this
"new" figure of 1,894,506 significantly
lowcr than the previously announced
total of 3,180,000 in May 1945, it was
bland admission that 890,532 were still
held captive in violation of the terms of
surrender imposed on the Germans at
Rheims on 7 May 1947 and the Potsdam Deelaration of 26 July 1945. 20
Despite repeated attempts on the
purt of the IRC and the Govcrnments of
the United States, Frane(~, mul (;rmlt
Britain, the Soviets refused inspections,
negotiations, or in some instanccs even
to reply to official qucries on the
subject of repatriation of Gcrman or
.Jupan($(~ prisoners of war.21 Finally, in
the fall of 1950, this mattcr of U.S.S.R.
failure to rcpatriatc or otherwise account for prisoners of war was presented to the United Nations. Germany
reported that as of March 1950 some
923,000 German prisoners of war, verified in the hands of the U.S.S.R., were
still missing. Japan listed at least
376,939 prisoners of war unaccounted
for at the end of 1949.
On 14 December 1950 the United
Nations General Assembly, by a vote of
43 to 5, adoptcd a resolution exprcssing
concern over tIll: larg{~ numher of pris0I11:rs of war that had "nuitlwr bmm
repatriated nor otherwise accounted
for." Thc rcsolution providcd for an Ad
Hoc Commission to settle the issue. 22
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Tlw U.S.S.R. adamantly refusI!d to eoopl!rate with the commission investigation?3
The harsh treatment of German and
Japanese prisoners of war by the Soviets
could be expected, though not eondOI1(!d, based on the treatment of Soviet
prisoners of war by these nations. The
Japanese, as mentioned earlier, treated
a" prisoners in a subhuman manner. The
German treatment of Russian prisoners
was more harsh than their treatment of
U.S. and British prisoners. 24 The
Soviets and Germans did not provide
lists of prisoners of war to each other as
sp(!cified by the Geneva Convention of
1929; whereas the United States and the
British did exchange lists with the Germans.
In October 19 tH, the Red army
issued a directive to a" Communist
int(!rrogators whieh induded the following instructions: "From the very
moment of capturc by the Red Army,
and during the entire period of captivity, the enemy cnlisted men and officers
must be under eontinuous indoctrination by our politil!al workers and intf!rrogators."25 This din:ctive was followed
by a series of othcr directives explaining
in detail the type of information to he
I!xtraeted from the German prisoners,
how to conduct til!! interrogations, and
the manner and ext(!nt of indoctrination. In general, these instructions provided for an initial interrogation of
about 30 minutes on purely military
matters as soon as conditions permitted.
Subsequent interrogations were to be
made at regimental level, again on military matters. Officers and senior NCO's
were also programed for further interrogation on military matters at division
level.
Upon arrival at a permanent camp,
prisoners were earlllarkl!d for more int(!l\l,iv(! interrogation. Tlw pI!rlllalwnt
eamps w(m: l'onlrolh'c\ hy tl\(' "I\IVI>."
muh'r till! snpl:rvision of tlu: I\linistry of
Internal Affairs, not til!! Ministry of
Dcfense. IL was during this period that a

fundamental evaluation was made eonel:rning the futlln! of eaeh prisoner of
war. The prisOllf!r was plaeed in either
of two categories. Either he was a
subject for indoctrination or he was not,
in which case he was consigned to a
labor camp.
Understanding of the Soviet treatnwnt of prisoners of war can be gained
from the writings of survivors such as
Sgl. Maj. Helmut M. Fehling, who endured 50111(: 6 years of eaptivity from
Oc:toher 194:l to Novl:mher 1949, and
Lt. Col. \V olfgang Sehe", imprisoned
from January 1945 to October 1955,
almost II years. Their vivid firsthand
accounts evidence the attention given to
the NCO's and officers in the interrogation process leading to the fundamental
categorization of the prisoners. Until
this decision was made, physical pressun! was applied only to selected individuals, never on a group basis. However, once it was determined through
interrogation that a prisoner was not a
profitable candidate for indoctrination,
he was sent to a labor camp to assist in
rebuilding Russia. The tn!lItnu!nt of
these "Iahor" prisoners, as distinct from
those who wcre carmarked for indoctrination, was unbelievably inhuman. It
WllS this group of lahor-eamp prisoners
who faeed a constant Laltlc: for survival
and whose ranks were thinned by the
hundreds of thousands not able to
survive the ballie. For example, of the
93,000 prisoners captured at the hattIe
of Stalingrad in February 1943, only
6,000 survived to return to Germany
through 1958.26
Within months of the German invasion of Poland and Russia in June 1941,
the Red Army recognized the need to
employ psychological warfare in support of military operations. By early
1942 the Seventh Division of the Red
ArlllY (prop.i~arHIa) was operatin~ on
till! I'al'tern front. (;I:rlllan 1:lIIi~n;~ ar\(1
pri&lIIers of war wl!re u&:I1. Vi(!tories of
the Gcrman Armies and crudcnl!ss of
the propaganda efforts initially
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hampered Soviet efforts. In early 1942,
in an attempt to improve the system,
the Soviets established anti-Fascist
schools (A-schools) staffed with selected
cadres to indoctrinatc prisoners of war
and train them for usc with the 7th
Division. The A-school candidates wcre
carefully choscn through a vigorous and
repetitive interrogation scrcening process. The first "hard-core" grours were
limited to 50 to 100 prisoners. 7 This
initial effort of using prisoners of war as
propaganda instruments to undermine
the morale of thc frontline troops was
greatly expanded as more collaborators
became available from the mounting
numbcr of prisoncrs being taken and as
the prisoners discerned the difference in
treatment at labor 'and political camps.
The A-schools, where students were
offered lectures in Marxist-Leninist doctrines, group discussions, self-criticism,
autobiographical eritiques, and rigid discipline, were continued until the early
] 950 'so Most hard-core graduates were
later transferred to East Germany to
occupy key 'positions in the administration, party bureaucraey, and media of
mass communications.
Post-World War II and the Korean
War. Even before the fuIl story of tl.le
shocking treatment visited upon millions of prisoners of World War II had
completely unfolded, it was apparent
that the Geneva Conventions of 1929
and conventions of the Hague Confe,rences of 1899 and 1907 required
revision. The International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) prepared four
draft conventions. These were reviewed
by the Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies at Geneva in
July 1946 and the Conference of Government Experts at Geneva in April
1947. They were then considered by the
17th International Conference of the
Red Cross at Stockholm in August
1948.28
Finally, the draft conventions were
submitted to a diplomatic conference of

59 nations at Geru:va in April 1949. TIH:
conventions did not corm: into forc(:
until 21 October I9!iO, and nOlu: of till:
parties in the Kon:an war had ratifi(:d
till: conventions at the time of the
outbreak of hostilities of 25 June 1950.
In prompt response to a qucry from the
ICRC, thc United States on 3 July 1950
announccd full adherence to till: provisions of the Geneva ConVl:lltions of
1949. Two days latcr, on :; July, the:
South Korean Governme:nt formally
announced its adhercnce to the conventions. As with U.S. acceptancc:, South
Korea agreed to admit reprcsentatives of
the lCRC into the area and to cooperate
fuIly with those repre:sentatives. The
Chincse Communists did not state a
position until 13 July 1952, when Chou
En-lai announced their recognition of
the conventions "since they are basically conducive to a lasting peace. ,>2 9
Repeated messages from the ICRC to
the North Korcan Government were
ignored. On 13 July 1950, Pak Heu
Yem, North Korean Minister of Foreign
Affairs, signed a message to the Secretary General of the United Nations
stating that: "the Demoeratic P(:oph: 's
Rcpublic of Korca is strictly abiding by
the principles of the Geneva Convention
in respcet to prisoners of war. ,,30 With
this message and suhse:que:nt commitments on the part of United Nations
members providing forces in support of
South Korea, all participants in this first
war after promlligntion of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 had indicated adherence.
. By mid-July 1950, representatives of
the lCRC were admitted to South Korea
to commence on-site inspcction and to
report concerning United Nations Cornmand (UNC) treatment of North
Korean prisoners of war.
As of 2 August 1950, the North
Korean Governmcnt had not responded
to ,IllY lCRC query or message: on till:
subjcct. Repeated attempts, even
through the Chinese Government in
Peking, to gain permission for an ICRC
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delegate to enter North Korea had met
with silence and inaction. Finally, on 15
August, a ray of hope was seen when
permission was granted for an ICRC
delegate to enter China to negotiate
with the North Korean Embassy representatives on entry into North Korea. 31
This hope proved to be unfounded, and
, further appeal to Jacob Malik, U.S.S.R.
representative on the U.N. Security
Council, was ignored.
Even after presentation of lists of
5,230 North Korean soldiers held captive by the UNC in mid-September
1950, the ICRC could not elicit any
communication or reaction from Pyongyang. The North Koreans did not attempt to provide packages for these
captives nor did they try to get mail to
or from them. The message was as clear
as it had been from the Russians of
World War II. The Communists, whose
governments arc founded on concern
for the workers and peasants, were not
concerncd with the welfare of their
prisoners of war while they were in the
hands of the UNC.
The extent of the brutal, cruel, and
inhuman treatmen't imposed on UNC
captives by the North Koreans was not
fully known at the time. Yet, shortly
after the Inchon landings, gruesome
examples wcre uncovered by the advancing U.N. forces. At Kumchon,
Taejon, and other places, as the UNC
forces advanced up the peninsula, the
evidence of brutal mass executions of
UNC prisoners of war and civilians was
uncovered. 32 The full extent of the
barbaric treatmcnt of UNC prisoners of
war at the hands of the North Korcans
did not bccome known until after the
prisoncrs had been repatriated in August
and September 1953.
In piecing together the threads of the
story of U.S. Marines captured during
the Korean war, a 1\'1arine author docunwnted that of one group 'of 38 U.S.
officers of all services captured by the
North Koreans through September
1950, only nine survived to the spring

of 1951.33 Though the numbers involved were small compared to .other
conflicts, especially World War II, the
overall record of treatment of UNC
prisoners of war in the hands of the
North Koreans matches' anI in sheer
cruelty' and inhumanity.3
Of the
known 7,190 U.S. prisoners of war
captured during the Korean war, 2,730,
or 38 percent, died in captivity. This is a
higher percentage than experienced in
our own Civil War in the middle of the
last century or of U.S. captives of the
Japanese during World War II. The
majority of these 2,730 who died were
captured during the first 6 months of
the war when the North Koreans had
custody of the prisoners of war. 3S In
addition to the 2,730 who died in
captivity, 1,036 others have been
authenticated as victims of battlefield
atrocities, mostly in massacres such as at
Kumchon and Taejon.36
The intervention of the Chinese ilJ
the conflict in November 1950, in addition to changing the conduct of the war,
also dramatically changed the enemy's
treatment and approach in handling and
processing UNC prisoners of war held
captive by the Communists. The Chinese took over control of the prisonerof-wur camps starting in December
1950.37 No longer was the main thcme
of treatment senseless beatings, public
parading of prisoners before enemy
citizenry who stared, spit upon, and
beat them, and limited (though frequently brutal) interrogation for military information. Concurrent with the
Chinese intervention came a marked
change in the treatment of the prisOIlcrs.
The Chinese publicly referred to
thcir policy as the "Lenient Policy."
Initially, the UNC prisoners could not
believe they were not to be shot or
otherwise maltreated upon capture.
Rather, the Chinese advised most prisoners that they only wanted to help
them now that they had been "liberated
from the control of the imperialists. ,,38
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By January 1951 the Chinese had established their first model indoetrination center at a permanent prisoner-ofwar camp ncar the Yalu River town of
Pyoktong. Designated "Camp 5" by the
Chinese, it became known facetiously
among the UNC prisoners as "Peaceful
Valley.,,39 Originally about 300 American prisoners of war were selected for
this pilot indoctrination center and institution of the "Lenient Policy." Here
the pattern of treatment quickly became abundantly clear. Calculated leniency was shown in return for "cooperation"; harassment, mental and
physical pressure for neutrality; and
brutality for resistance to their "leniency.'>4 0
To the Chinese, cooperation meant
attending classes on the Marxist-Leninist
theories; informing on feHow prisoners
who resisted; signing documents and
petitions seeking peace or acknowledging the "rightness" of the Communist cause; broadcasts of the same
type propaganda or even stronger denouncements of the "American Wall
Street warmongers"; and making selfaccusations before fellow prisoners.
These "progressivcs," as the cooperators
became known, found themselves under
mounting pressure to succumb to the
increasing demands of the Chines(! indoctrination program. This trend, so
easy to discern in a position of comfortable reflection, was not apparent to
many subjected to the treatment under
the conditions existing in "Peaceful
Valley." Paradoxically, many prisoners
became problTessives to be relieved of
the physical and psychological pressures
imposed by the Chinese captors. The
same held true for the "neutrals," or
those who gave indications that their
will might be broken, but had not yet
overtly cooperated. 41
The miRn()mer of Ihe "I.eni('nl
Policy" IH:(:anw Rlrikin~ly apl'an~nt 10
the "reaetionarieR," or resisters to Chinese indoctrination. The cases of Capt.
Jesse V. Booker, USMC, and Maj. John

J. I)lInn, U.S. Army, are typical of the
treatnwnt viRitecl on "n:actionary" prisoners. Booker was the first marine to be
taken prisoner in the Korean war. Flying from the decks of the U.S.S. Valley
Forge, his plane was shot down on 7
August 1950. Dunn had been serving as
an adviser to Republic of Korea (ROK)
forces whose positions had been overrun
by the Chinese ncar Kunu-ri in November 1950.42 These officers were subjected to frequent and inccssant interrogation centcred on their political bcliefs
and family backgrounds. They wert!
kept awake by beatings and blowing
smoke into their forcibly opened eyes.
Still refusing to cooperate, they were
tied to stakes in the open or placed in
cramped solitary holes in the ground
and left naked for hours on end in the
subfreezing weather of the winter of
1950-51'in the Yalu River valley. Still
not willing to do the bidding of their
captors, both Booker and Dunn were
separately and repeatedly exposed to
the threat of execution, in which the
"game of Russian roulette" was played
by the Chinesc interrogators. 4 3
While the Chinese took control of
the UNC prisoners of war in Communit-lt
hands, they did permit their North
Korean comrades to partic:ipa te' and
pn:~lIll1ably Ic:arn tlu: priru:iplc:s of iIlL(:rrogation and indoctrination for political
objectives. "Pak's Palace" on the outskirts of Pyongyang, the North Korean
capital, was named for Major Pak, the
North Korean chief interrogator. This
infamous center was singled out in the
Sccretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoller of War Report of ] 955
as heing "the worst camp endlln~d by
American prisolu:rs of war.'>44 Captain
Fink, a U.S. Marine officer, was questioned in 1951 by a Russian female
interro~ator over a period of silvera I
(Iay~. Th(~ inl!'rrogaliollR w('n~ I'UIH:IlIal(:(1 wilh r(~l'eal!'(1 II(!alill~ll of Cap.
tain Fink for non[(!Sl'onsivl! llllt-lW(:rs. 45
Even before the Chinese intervention
in the Korean war, Communist usc of
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prisoners of war for political purposes
was evident. In late August 1950, Jacob
A. Malik, U.S.S.R. delegate to the U.N.
Security Council, issued a statement to
the world press claiming to have reedved a cable of protest to the war
signed by 39 captured U.S. officers. The
prob:st was "against further senseless
bloodshed in Korea." The names of the
39 officers were released and included
"Capt. Jesse V. Booker.'>4 6 In light of
the treatment subsequently inflicted on
Booker, it is doubtful if the Communists ever obtained Booker's signature on the protest. Indeed, the majority of the officers whose names were
rcleased subsequently denied under oath
having signed the protest.47
This early and rather clumsy propaganda attempt was greatly refined and
improved after the Chinese took over
control of the prisoners of war in
December 1950. In January 1951 the
Chinese circulated the "Stockholm
Peace Appeal" in "Peaceful ValIey" and
other camps with indoctrination centers. This appeal had been issued just
prior to the North Korean invasion of
South Korea as a result of a Stockholm
meeting of the "Communist World
Peace Committee" in May 1950.48 In
circulating this appeal, peace committees were formed in the prisoner-of-war
camps to develop and sign a petition to
the U.N. appealing for peace. This petition was sent to tIll! U.N. in February
1951 with the signatures of many
American prisoners of war.. 49
Concurrent with the success of the
U.N. spring offensive of 1951, the
North Koreans on 8 May 1951 lodged a
formal protest to the U.N. charging the
U.S. forces with germ warfare. 5 0
It was at this time that the Communists tried to substantiate these
charges by a program aimed at gaining
the eoop,!ration of lar~c1y U.S. Air
Force flying personnel. 5 On 16 May
1952 the signed confessions of two
captured U.S. lieutenants appeared in
People's China, a Peking newspaper, and

were announced to the world. 5 2 Despite the failure to have their alIegations
proven with the aid of confessions of
American prisoners of war, grave doubt
on the matter was created in world
public opinion.
In the aftermath of the Korean war,
Communist attempts to usc prisoners of
war and their families to weaken the
opposition came more clearly into
focus. In testimony before a U.S. House
of Representatives Subcommittee of the
Committee on Un-American Activities
in .I une 1956, FBI witnesses and former
U.S. prisoners of thc Korean war exposed the extent of the Communist
efforts in this area. ''The Save Our Sons
Committee" (SOSC) based in Argo, III.
became active in 1952 and remained so
until October 1953, the month following the repa'triation of the Korean war
prisoners. The SOSC consisted of two
native-born American women, identified
by FBI agents as members of the American Communist Party. These women
obtained the names, camp locations,
and other particulars of American prisoners from Communist sources. They
wrote lellers to the parents and friends
of thcse prisoners, encouraging them to
sign petitions and letters to Congressmen and newspapers. They were able to
correspond directly ~ith the Ameriean
prisoners in a matter of days, whereas
mail between prisoners and next of kin
was normalIy not alIowed hy the Communist captors. Though these two
women repeatedly claimed the "fifth
amendment" during the hearings, facts
presented by other witnesses clearly
established Communist efforts in this
area. 53
The major issue of the Korean Armistice Negotiations was voluntary repatriation. A convincing position is that the
UNC demands, insisting on voluntary
n:p:ltriatioll, were in violation of the
Geneva Conventio/ls of 1949, specificalIy articles 7 and 118. Article 7
provides that prisoners may under no
circumstances renounce, in whole or in
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part, rights securcd to them hy thc
convention. Article 118 statcs that prisoners of war shall he released and
repatriated without delay after thc cessation of hostilities. The opposing
humanitarian view of not forcing some
87,000 people to he committed to
return to control of regimes they ahhor
also has merit. It would he difficult to
ignore the lessons learned from the
Soviet treatment of repatriated personnel at the end of World War II.
Vice Adm. C. Turncr Joy, the initial
Chief UNC Negotiator from July 1951
until 22 May 1952, differed strongly on
this point, although his position as UNC
negotiator required him to support it.
He felt the voluntary repatriation issue
cost our prisoners an extra year of
captivity and cost the UNC an additional 50,000 casualties., Joy later contended that the welfare of ex-enemy
soldiers was placed abovc that of our
own personnel in Communist prison
camps and those still fighting In the
hattleline. 54
To date, international law has not
codified the principle of voluntary repatriation. Yet the signed armisticc itself may sustain the principle as a
precedent. In any event, this principle is
Korea's legaey to Vietnam. Consideration must he given this principle to
insure success in ohtaining the release of
our prisoners of war in the months
ahead.
Vietnam. Major conflicts have given
impetus to changes in international laws
which have heen increasingly concerned
with the humanitarian treatment of
prisoners and other victims of war. The
Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949,
following World Wars I and II, respectively, illustrate this. No change occurred following the Korean war. Resolution of the voluntary repatriation
issue stemming from the Korean armistice was heralded as a significant precedent hy President Eisenhower. Yet, the

impact or'this precedent on international law is a matter of conjecture at
this time. With this possihle exception,
international law relative to the treatment of prisoners of war is essentially
the same for Vietnam as it was for the
Korean war.
Shortly after the introduction of
American forces into the Vietnam war,
the ICRC in June 1965 reminded the
Governments of the United States,
South Vietnam, and North Vietnam, hy
letter, of the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and of their previous commitments to adhere to the
conventions. 55 The JCRC also indicated
it would attempt to deliver the letter to
the National Liberation Front (NLF),
the political arm of the Viet Congo
All parties, including the NLF, replied to the JCRC letter. The United
States and South Victnam gave unqualificd assurance of thcir compliancc with
the conventions and authorized the
ICRC to send designatcd inspection
representatives. 5 6 North Vietnam's reply was not as straightforward. It was a
lengthy reply couched in terms that
make it difficult to isolate truly responsive portions. The Ictter did state that
"pilots" would he regarded as "major
criminals" and liable to the laws of
North Vietnam, "allhough captlJrl:d
pilots are treated well. "57 Clearly,
North Vietnam was saying officially
that they treated pilots well, hut reserved the right not to do so. The NLF
flatly refused to he hound hy the
Geneva Conventions; however, they
affirmed that "prisoners held were
humanely treated and that, above all,
enemy wounded were collected and
eared for."5 1\ Upon sending troops in
support of South Vietnam, all other
nations (notahly Australia, New Zealanel, Thailand, South Korca, and the
Philippines) acknowledged the Geneva
Conventions as hinding. Thus, all active:
participants in the Vietnam war, except
the NLF, formally announced their
general adherence to the conventions.
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The record of the United States in
Vietnam relative to the treatment of
prisoners of war has not been officially
questioned by the enemy. However, two
major issues have arisen, one involving
overt actions of the South Vietnamese.
In each instance attention to the issues
has been "self-generated," being instituted by Americans, not the cncmy.
As early as 1964, reports began
reaching the United States concerning
maltreatment of Viet Cong prisoners of
war by South Vietnamese captors.
These reports continued through 1965,
the time of American commitment to
the ground war, and eonccrned enemy
personnel initially captured by Amcrican forces as well as those captured by
South Vietnamese forces. In a few
instances American personnel were pictured observing the alleged maltreatments. These instances apparently took
place at the scene of the fighting or
during evacuation from it.5 9 There is
liLLIe doubt that instances of maltreatment occurred. There has ncver been a
war in ..which somc frontlinc maltrcatment has not taken place. 6 0 The announced American position was that
these incidents of maltreatment were
alleged against an ally, South Vietnam,
which bore responsibility for handling
prisoners, not the United States. This
initial American position was legally
correct but morally questionable. There
is "no provision in the Geneva Conventions making a nation responsible for
violations committed by its allies.'>6 1
Initially, American ground forces
turned over enemy prisoners to the
South Vietnamese forces as Soon as
possible. Mindful of the maltreatment
charges, the U.S. forces changed procedures in 1966 and retained custody of
captured enemy until delivered to rear
area eamps.62 No similar charges were
made aftrr this until 1969, whcn rd(~asc
of information lIl"~ging tlw unlawful
killing of some 100 South Vidnamesc
civilians at the Song My hamlet of My
Lai, SOllth Vietnam, on 16 March 1968.

At this writing, a number of American
fighting men arc awaiting trial on
charges resulting from actions at My
Lai. Fourteen others have been charged
with repressing information concerning
the incident and may be brought to
trial. 63
The South Vietnamese operate the
prisoner-of-war camps containing some
31,500 North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong prisoners of war. There have been
documented cases of maltreatment in
the six camps operated by the South
Vietnamese. Significantly, complaints in
these cases have been .filed by the lCRC
representativcs having acecss to the
camps for inspection. I; 4 The prisoners
are pcrmittcd to send and receive mail.
An accounting of the prisoners is made
and lists arc made availablc to North
Vietnam and the NLF.65 Every effort is
made to comply with the Geneva Conventions and rcquests of the ICRC
representatives. 66
The story of treatment of allied
prisoners of war (United States, South
Vietnam, South Korea, Australian, and
others) by the North Vietnamese (and
thcir con federates, the Viet Cong, under
the NLF) is far from complete. That
which is known is available from two
sources; the information the North Vi(:tnamese have seen fit to disclose for
propaganda and political purposes and
from questioning of released or escaped
prisoncrs. 67 Evcn with the limited
sources of information available to datc,
the complctc disregard of international
law by North Victnam is abundantly
clear. Equally clear, and of greater
concern, is thc callous treatment of
prisoners of war by the North Vietnamese. They have shown the same
characteristics of Communists in previous wars: a complete disregard for
humalll: treatmcnt; a concerted effort to
us(' prisoners for propa~an(la purpos($;
lind lin utter disn'ganl for tl\(\ welfare of
thcir own pcople once captured.
In mid-J uly 1966, broadcasts from
Radio Hanoi and dispatches from
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Communist newsmen served notice that
captured American flyers were to be
tried as war criminals, and American
prisoners were paraded, manacled, in
the streets of Hanoi, presumably to
whip up local public support. Photographs of thcse happcnings werc taken
~nd disseminated in the world press. 68
This bra7.en effort at political blaekmail
baekfired. The obvious intent of conducting trials of thcse prisoners to forel:
a halt in the bombing of North Vil~tnam
and gain world sympathy was a miscalculation. U.N. Secretary General U
Thant, the Pope, and American organi7.ations opposed to the war in Vietnam
51:nt appeals to Ho Chi Minh to stop the
scheduled trials. Even the so-called U.S.
Senate "doves," spearhcadcd by Scnator
Frank Church, issucd strong statements
against the trials. 69 On 23 July 1966,
Ho Chi Minh backed down and announccd that "no trials were in view."
It appears that when Ho Chi Minh
reali7.ed he was losing support for his
political objectives, particularly from
within the United States where a hardened unified American position might
result, Ill: relcntl'd.
Earlier, in June and Septlanber 1965,
following trials and cxecution of Viet.
Cong terrorists by the South Vietnam
Government, the Liheration Radio of
thc Vict Cong announced that Ameriean
prisoners of war had been cxccuted in
retaliation for the trial and execution of
the tcrrorists. Im:spective of thc legul or
moral issues concerning acts of reprisal,
thc wanton murdcr of American prisoners in retaliation for an act of South
Vietnam is clearly neither legally nor
morally valid. The ICRC concurrcd in
this view in filing formal complaints and
requesting permission to investigate. 7 0
The execution of onc of these victiIns, Capt. Humbert R. Versm:e, was
con firmed in December 196B by 1\ laj.
James N. Rowe wlwn he escaped aftl~r
being a prisoner of the Viet Cong for
over 5 years. 7 1 Rowe and Versace had
been among a group of eight prisoncrs

captured by the Vil:t Cong in Oetobl:r
1963 and hdd in till: ddta n:p;ion of
South Vietnam. According to Rowe,
threc of the prisoners dicd during captivity in J966 and 1967, while the other
three wcre released through Cambodia
in October 1967. 72
The story unfolded by Rowe substantiates that the Viet Gong follow the
same pattern already estahlished by the
Communists for treatment of prisolwrs
of war. Immediately after eapture Rowe
was §iven an ICRG data eard to fill
ou L. 7 Appended to this card was a
lengthy questionnaire concerning full
details of personal and military history,
training, and military intelligence. Rowe
refused to fiII out the questionnaire;
then the established Communist treatment started. Rowe was subjected to
isolation from human contact and
placed in a confining, uncomfortable
cage as conditioners for the inevitable
indoctrination. Part of the indoctrination included explanations that Rowe
was a criminal having 'no rights and that
his captors had the right to execute him.
The reason given for not executing him
was the "lenient policy" of the Viet
Congo Upon "failing indoctrination lessons," Rowe was sent to a punishment
camp where he was subjected to treatment even worse than before. His dieto£
rice and salt, without water, severely
strained his stamina and will to survive. 7 4
The politically inspircd, unprl:dictahl!: releascs of othcr groups of Amcrican prisoners, cithcr to pcacc-seeking
antiwar Americans in Cambodia or at
arranged meetings in c1earcd areas of
South Vietnam, also provides insight to
prisoner-of-war treatment by North
Vietnam and the Viet Congo The stories
of some of those men have not been
puhlished for fear of jeopardi?ing thosc
remaining as prisOIwrs. What has IIm'n
loltl is anollwr ehrnnidl~ of l:nll'l mill
inhullIan trt:alnHmt hy llw Cllnllnunists.
In August 1969, Navy Ll. Robert F.
Frishman, upon his release, related his
expcriences as a prisoner of war of the
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Communists, which included solitary
confinement, imprisonment in a eage,
bdng bound in straps, removal of his
fingernails, being denied food and
medical care, and hdng dragged along
the ground while suffering a brohn ·Ieg.
Seaman Douglas Hegdahl, released at
the same time after over 2 years of
captivity, was also maltreated. He had
lost over 60 pounds since his capture
and had spent 7 months and 10 days in
solitary confinement.
The experience of Lt. (jg) Dieter
Dengler, USN, during 1966 presents a
stark example of treatment at the hands
of the Communists in Southeast Asia.
Dengler was captured but later managed
to escape to U.S. lines. Captured by tlu:
Pathet Lao and turned over to the
North Vietnamese, Dengler was spreadeagled on the ground and left to tlw
mercy of insects. He was tied in position
and us(:d for nerve· racking target practice. Repeatedly, Dengler was bcaten
with fists and sticks, being rendered
unconscious on one occasion. As further
pcrsuasion to sign a statement condemning the United States and apparently to heighten the enjoyment of
his captors, Dengler was bound and
dragged through the bush hehind a
water buffalo. At the time of his reseue
this formerly IHO.pound pilot wdghed
9H pounds. 7s
The stories' of maltreatment from
escaped prisoners, and even from those
rcll!ased for propaganda purposes, have
a common thread. Admittedly, the
documented evidence available at this
time is limit(:d. Yet the evidcrlee available is overwhelmingly uniform in reflecting callous and inhumane treatment
of our prisoners in the hands of the
Communists in Southeast Asia. A pattern has emerged which includes jungle
camps operated by the Viet Cong and
the Pathet Lao and the larger permam:nt
camps operated by the North Vietna'
mese. The most notorious of these
North Vietnamese camps is known already as the "Hanoi Hilton." It appears

likely that this facility will join "Pak's
Palace" of the Korean war on tlH! list of
infamous prisol\(:r.of-war camps.
These limited glimpses of the treatm(:nt of prisoners of war in Vietnam
give cause for grave concern for the
treatment of the estimated J ,400
American prisoners still in the hands of
the Communists in Vietnam. 76 As of
Fehruary 1970, the Department of Defense listed 422 Americans known to
have been in the hands of the Communists in ViI:tnam. These figures have
been compiled from eyewitness battle
accounts, information from released
prisoners, as well as from Hanoi press
and radio announcements. 77 The Communists have to dall: refused to eomi.ly
with the Geneva Conventions and provide lists of prisoners they hold. In
March J970 North Vil!lnam did
acknowledge to an Associated Press
newsman (Daniel De Luee) that they
held 320 American prisoners of war and
"were considering" releasing their
names, not to ICRC representatives, but
to "friendly" news media. 7 8
Repeated attempts by the Ameriean
Government and relatives to obtain information on AIll(:riean prisoners held
hy the Communists have failed. 7 9
R(!Sponsl! to thes(: grou I's wou 1<1 not
materially henefit or support the political objectives of the Communists and,
therefore, seem doomed to failure. Massive direct pressure by American citizens, appeals by "dovish" U.S. Congressmen and other vehement American
antiwar groups, and concentrated efforts by the Government through the
United Nations would appear to offer
the best opportunity for determining
the status of American prisoners in
Vietnam and insuring their welfare and
ultimate freedom. Since the North Vietnamese consider thcir own captured
personnel as expendahle and since they
know WI: value highly the lives and
welfare of our soldiers in captivity, they
are using their control of our prisoners
of war as a bargaining tool for propa-
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ganda and leverage for a seulement of
the war favorable to them.
Legacy and Lessons. The development of meaningful and essential international law relative to prisoners of war
has been extremely slow, yet ever more
precisely defined. Up to World War II
this development had significant impact
on improving the humanitarian treatment of prisoners. From World War II
ca)1le the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
which materially strengthened the law
in this area, more elearly defined its
application, and provided for humane
treatment agreed upon by some 117
nations as of 1968. 30 From World War
II also came distinct evid{:nce that,
regardless. of the law and weight of
world opinion, the Communists did not
intend to abide by international law to
which they and others had commiUed
themselves. As the history of World War
II unfolded with the pasSing of time,
more precise proof became available.
The extent and enormity of some of the
evidence strains humanitarian understanding, and even today many ignore
or refuse to assess the record.
In the aftermath of the Korean war it
became elear once again that the Communists had shown an utter disregard
for internation:11 law and contempt for
humanitarian treatment of prisoners of
war, which other peoples and nations
sought to uphold. Though smaller in
scale, the barbaric and cruel treatment
of prisoners of war by the Communists
established a record in modern times for
the high rate of death among captives.
Again the rules for conduct of affairs
among nations were severely set back.
This demonstrated contempt for the
preccpts of human dignity and compassion for fellowmen is appalling. This,
coupled with the hypocrisy of elaiming
adherence to international law, whih~
resolutely and {!onsistently failing to do
so, invites more grave questions. Although only shreds of evidence are
available from the current war in Viet-

nam, these shreds point to the Communists adding to the legacy pass(:d on
from World War 11 and Korea.
A review of history supports the
contention that prisoncrs of war havc
been used as instruments of foreign
policy. Concurrent with the evolution
of international law, mounting concern
for the humane treatmcnt of prisOlH:rs
of war has rcsultcd in increasing weIldefined international agreements to protect the victims of war, thus tending to
reduce thc effcctivcness of prisoners of
war as inslrunH:nls of foreign potiey for
those nations a(lIl1:ring to tIl!: law.
Starting in World War II and continuing
through to the current Vietnam war, the
Communists have demonstratcd a complete reluctance to be inhibited in their
use of prisoners of war to achieve
national and international political objectives. This remains so, whether or not
they profess adherencc to international
conventions.
Based on the record of trcatment
accorded their own pcople whcn rccovered from captivity, the Communists
arc not receptive to bargaining for thc
exchange or tn:atment of prisolwrs
predicated on humanitarian prineiph:s.
Accordingly, it appears that cven when
assured of our propricty in the treatIIlI:IIt of llwir priHOIH:rH, tIll: CO/ll/llllniHtH
arc unwilling to reciprocate and guarantee humane treatment for U.S. prisoners
of war. This, coupled with thc fundamental principle of the dignity and
rights of man upon which the Government of the United States is based, rules
out any consideration of reprisal against
Communist prisoners as ineffective and
repugnant.
Thus, to obtain humane treatment
and release of prisoners from Communist control, it appears that the most
re~llisti(: alternative is to marshal Am(:rie:m opinion unifying tlw eoulltry on tIll:
issue. To affirm our n:solv(: to ckny tIn:
Communists their political ohjeetiv(:s
through usc of ollr prisoners of w:lr is
the most positiVI: way to insure their
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fair treatment and release. In this regard
the text of President Nixon's First
Annual Foreign Affairs Message to
Congress of February 1970 conccrning
thc treatmcnt and rclease of prisoners of
war merits comment and is quoted in
part bclow:
This [prisoners of war in Vietnam] is not a political or military
issue, but a matter of basic
humanity. There may be disagrccmcnt about other aspects of this
conflict, but thcre can be no
disagreement on humane treatment for prisoners of war. I state
again our readiness to proceed at
once to arrangements for the release of prisoners of war on both
sides. 81
This statement is a true reflcction of
previously stated American policy and
most likely was heartily supported by
the majority of people of the United
States. However, considering that it is.a
part of a 40,000-word address designed
for foreign as well as domcstic consumption, the rcaetion of the Communists would seem of paramount importance. The Communists would not agree
with the first portion of the pronounc(!mcnL which statcs that the prisorwr-o(war qucstion in Vietnam " •.. is not a
political or military issue, but a matter
of basic humanity." The history of
Communist actions disputes that portion of the address which states
" •.• thcre can be no disagreement on
humane treatment for prisoners of
war." Finally, in advising the Communists of "our readincss to proceed at
once with arrangements for the release
of prison~s of war on bO!.h. sides," they
are being advised of a fact of which they
have been fully cognizant. In summary,
the statement of the President appears to
have contributed little toward obtaining
humane treatment and release of American prisoners of war.
Positive statements by our national

leaders are needed, recognizing that
prisoners of war are used as "political
instruments" by the Communists, but
affirming U.S. rcjection of this practice.
Idcntification and clarification of the
fact that thcre is "disagreement on
humane treatment of prisoners of war"
between the Communists and ourselves
is also required. Lastly, a positive declaration should be made that any peace
negotiations must first obtain agreemcnts on the accounting for and release
of prisoncrs of war.
Thc CommunisL practicc of releasing
small groups of our prisoners of war to
American pacifist groups should be
dcnounced for the degrading and inhumane practice it is. As slated by the
Washington Evening Star the practice is
"a little like the Oriental water tortureand just as humanitarian." To put this
release ploy in perspective, consider that
at the current rate of release it would
take over 400 years to obtain the release
of our captured men. 82
Ho Chi Minh recanted in July 1966
on his threat to try American prisoners
as war criminals due to til(! w(~ight of
world public opinion, especially the
slaLements of some U.S. Senators. Again
in August 1969, at the instigation of
prisoners' next of kin, 42 U.S. Senators
signed a strong statement condemning
North Vietnam for its record of violation of international law and for its
"crucl and inhuman treatment of
prisoners of war." This statement also
condemned the callous treatment of the
families of prisoners who traveled to
Paris seeking information about the
prisoners from the North Vietnamese
delegates to the peace talks. On 21
August the North Vietnamese rejected
the protest. It is significant to note that
sollie of the leading antiwar Senators,
including the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Affairs Committee, had not
signed the statement of protest. The full
impact of a similar statement signed by
all 100 Senators or" of a joint resolution
by Congress is a maller of conjecture.
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The question that presents itself is
"Why should this critical matter he left
to conjccturc?"
The necd to focus attention on the
current plight of American prisoners in
the hands of the Communists is evident.
Previous limited success in comhating
the Communists' use of prisoners of war
as instruments of foreign policy has
been allained only when antiwar fa(:-

tions in the United States, particularly
members of Congress, have repudiatcd
these inhuman practices. It appears that
these factors must drive concerted
American efforts to deny the Communists their political objectives. The eontin ued maltreatment of American
prisoncrs of war in direct violation of
international law is totally Ultaec(:ptablc.
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